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L'analyse économique des litiges individuels du travail

Abstract : Employment protection refers both to regulations governing hiring and firing rules and finds its sources in legislation, collectively bargained conditions or customary practice. For about fifteen years, a large macroeconomic literature has studied the impact of employment protection on the labor market?s performances, or more precisely the effects of firing rules on the employment rate, the unemployment duration and rate. More recent works begin to emphasize other consequences of employment protection, i.e. its effects in terms of incentives on the behavior of individuals : facing a given legislation in terms of dismissal, economic agents adapt themselves, react and tend to adopt a strategic behavior. This thesis is related to this literature by exploring the individual incentives generated by labor law. Indeed, labor law related to firing and its enforcement by the courts have consequences on the behavior of parties to a labor relationship at several levels. On one hand, dismissal laws have an impact ex ante on the respective investment levels of employers and workers within their relationship : indeed, the way courts adjudicate a dispute due to a dismissal and notably the elements which are taken into account in their decisions have an impact on the incentives of parties to make specific investments. Thus, the theoretical analysis which is displayed shows what economic and social elements judges should take into account if their objective is the maximization of investment levels chosen by both parties. On the other hand, the design of judicial procedures also has an impact of the behavior of agents once the conflict has begun between the parties. By leading comparisons between several disputes? resolution systems thanks to theoretical tools and an experimental analysis, this thesis participates to current legal debates over the ability of procedures to generate as many agreements as possible, allowing for the reduction of judicial costs.
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Eve-Angéline Lambert. L'analyse économique des litiges individuels du travail. Economies et finances. Université Nancy 2, 2008. Français. ⟨NNT : 2008NAN20009⟩. ⟨tel-01752718⟩



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