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Valeur de Shapley et répartition des dommages civils en cas de multiples co-auteurs

Abstract : Courts often face the difficult problem of establishing damage causation and apportioning compensation payments among multiple tortfeasors. However, legal scholars and practitioners are still looking for a systematic apportionment method. We analyse these issues from a cooperative game perspective. The problem is modelled as a transferable utility game to which standard solution concepts can be applied. Instead of reasoning on causation, we use the traditional solution of cooperative game theory to apportion the damages due by each tortfeasor. The Shapley value is particularly suited to this legal context, as its axioms are consistent with the fundamental principles of private law.
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https://hal.univ-lorraine.fr/hal-01735888
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Submitted on : Friday, March 16, 2018 - 2:45:45 PM
Last modification on : Wednesday, August 31, 2022 - 3:10:44 AM

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Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License

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Samuel Ferey. Valeur de Shapley et répartition des dommages civils en cas de multiples co-auteurs. Economie et Prévision, 2015, 1-2 (202-203), pp.37-52. ⟨10.3917/ecop.202.0037⟩. ⟨hal-01735888⟩

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