Puissance d'achat et concurrence dans la grande distribution

Abstract : This dissertation deals with the costs and the benefits of retailers' buyer power. This power provides efficiency when it offers competitive prices and variety of products to consumers but can also distort producer competition and increase market power. In chapter 1, the retailers' behaviour explains the rise of the national brands prices after enactment of regulations in 1996. The hard discounters' entry on the market and the tariff positioning of private labels were not enough to stop this rise. In chapter 2, a French distribution networks case study justifies the coexistence of integrated groups and independent cooperatives. We use transaction cost framework and show that there is a differential of specificity of assets. The price competitiveness of independent cooperatives is explained by the choice of ?tierstemps? to govern buying groups which saves on transaction costs. A model of private law enforcement by the retailer is proposed in the third chapter. A retailer punishes his suppliers for the harm abided. The main result is the following: deterrence is generally excessive when the retailer uses monetary and\or non monetary quasipenalties. Finally, in chapter 4, an empirical analysis of the production of private labels shows that retailers choose national brand producers in coherence with their brand strategy. Moreover, retailers prefer national brand producers when their bargaining power is weak and when there are more small and medium-sized firms.
Document type :
Theses
Complete list of metadatas

Cited literature [116 references]  Display  Hide  Download

https://hal.univ-lorraine.fr/tel-01752686
Contributor : Thèses Ul <>
Submitted on : Thursday, March 29, 2018 - 1:54:24 PM
Last modification on : Tuesday, May 22, 2018 - 11:15:34 AM

File

2007NAN20004.pdf
Files produced by the author(s)

Identifiers

  • HAL Id : tel-01752686, version 1

Citation

Nicolas Delord. Puissance d'achat et concurrence dans la grande distribution. Droit. Université Nancy 2, 2007. Français. ⟨NNT : 2007NAN20004⟩. ⟨tel-01752686⟩

Share

Metrics

Record views

85

Files downloads

662