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La rationalité d'un point de vue logique entre dialogue et inférentialisme : étude comparative de Lorenzen et Brandom

Abstract : This thesis presents a conception of rationality that steers clear of the problem of the idealization of the logical agent's abilities, which is typical of static conceptions of axiomatic rationality, where an agent is rational only insofar as he doesn?t contradict himself, with no consideration for the cognitive abilities that are assigned to him by the set of axioms which express the standards to which he has to adhere to be considered as rational (e.g., in "standard" decision theory and in Hilbertian axiomatic proof systems). To avoid those idealizations, I suggest that one adopts the dialogical approach to logic (Lorenzen), because it allows one to abandon classical logic in favour of a "weaker" logic and to develop an alternative conception of rationality which is "non monotonic", i.e., "not cumulative" and "dynamic". I discuss in this context the possibility of proceeding to a radicalization of the assertability conditions of Dummett?s anti-realist meaning theory, in order to provide a better account of the acts of justification that fall within the scope of a real, non-idealized, logical agent, and its implications for the choice of logic. I defend, on this basis, a conception of rationality of logical agents in terms of their real, non-idealized abilities to justify their assertions in a dialogical way. At the end, I suggest that one should look at the Sellars-Brandom?s notion 'Socratic' rationality theory and compare it with Lorenzen?s pragmatic approach, as both aim to make explicit what is implicit in our language-games, that is to prove and to be able to justify what we have asserted.
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Frédérick Tremblay. La rationalité d'un point de vue logique entre dialogue et inférentialisme : étude comparative de Lorenzen et Brandom. Philosophie. Université Nancy 2, 2008. Français. ⟨NNT : 2008NAN21015⟩. ⟨tel-01752726⟩



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