Skip to Main content Skip to Navigation
New interface

Evaluation de la législation en matière de dépenses électorales : effets pervers et contraintes stratégiques pour les acteurs politiques

Abstract : The aim of the thesis is to evaluate the effects of French legislation (particularly the act of 15 January 1990) on electoral spending and on the behavior of political actors, which is taken to mean election candidates. The question is in what way the legal constraints (ceiling on spending and limitation on means of communication) have caused candidates to modify their campaign strategies. The methodology of the study is based on two hypotheses. The first hypothesis considers the effects of the legislation, depending on the status of the politician. The study differentiates on the one hand between party candidates and freestanding candidates, and on the other between retiring or +cumulative; candidates and aspiring candidates. The second hypothesis deals with the effects of the law, depending on the type of election (national or local) and on the importance (general election or by election). As a result, by including all the national and local elections that have taken place within the country since 1992, this evaluation of the legislation forms part of a decidedly dynamic approach. The thesis consists of two parts which allow the argument to go beyond the two initial hypotheses without however discounting them. In the first part, we show that the aim of the legislators (to give equal chances to all) is directly countered by the facts and by the behavior of the political actors. The law in fact considerably adds to the inequality of their chances because it allows some candidates to make wrongful use of their experience to conduct their campaign and to mobilize the media. The legal framework and precedents help to redress the existing inequalities, but this only serves to limit the freedom of the political actors. The second part deals more specifically with campaigns on the ground. We show that all the politicians, whatever the nature of the election in which they are engaged, have adapted to the legislation in identical ways. Consequently, they are constrained by the same requirements (to register their political action over the duration) and they contribute to the standardization of the electoral campaign. By way of conclusion, the study proposes an account in terms of adverse effects and strategic constraints
Document type :
Complete list of metadata
Contributor : Administrateur Du Ccsd Connect in order to contact the contributor
Submitted on : Tuesday, April 24, 2018 - 4:09:00 PM
Last modification on : Tuesday, January 12, 2021 - 3:07:08 PM

Intranet access


  • HAL Id : tel-01776964, version 1



Laura Nakic. Evaluation de la législation en matière de dépenses électorales : effets pervers et contraintes stratégiques pour les acteurs politiques. Science politique. Université Nancy 2, 1999. Français. ⟨NNT : 1999NAN20004⟩. ⟨tel-01776964⟩



Record views