Skip to Main content Skip to Navigation

L’emploi des blindés français sur le front occidental d’août 1944 à mai 1945

Abstract : The aim of this thesis is to analyze the use of armored vehicles globally and up to the smallest levels (platoons, crews), that is to say at the level of men (slogan that has become fashionable ever since). Indeed, many previous writings and studies often remain at the tactical or strategic level. It is also a question of studying the possible differences between the doctrinal theory and its application in the field, to see if the use of armored vehicles varied according to the actors and if so why. This study is intended to be comprehensive, it takes into account, men (thus their training, their origin, their past), doctrine and equipment because employment in combat is the meeting of all these factors. Research shows that the three French armored GUs were not employed in the same way, the main reason residing in the chiefs' conceptions of employment. French armored units were made up of men with different backgrounds and backgrounds. From the historical Gaullists to the young worker of August 1944, passing by the recalled African army. All found themselves in the turrets with the same goal to liberate the country. They themselves had various origins. Some had continued to fight, others had remained in North Africa or West Africa until the Allied landings of November 1942. But all showed a high level of tactical mastery and professionalism. Their equipment and organization were homogeneous because of American origin. Their concept of employment was that dictated by the FM that they adapted to their hand to fight the French and sometimes mark their difference compared to the allies. Once engaged, they held their place alongside the allied units, proving their value and thus marking the rebirth of the French army. This uniqueness of organization, doctrine and equipment, however, masks differences in employment. They were tributaries of the great units to which they were attached and of their leader. The use of armored units depended largely on men. Chiefs first, all of whom did not have the same conceptions of the use of armored units, which resulted in frustrations and conflicts in particular between Generals Leclerc and de Lattre. But also crews who showed a remarkable state of mind but particular and a lot of self-sacrifice.
Document type :
Complete list of metadata
Contributor : Thèses UL Connect in order to contact the contributor
Submitted on : Friday, May 24, 2019 - 2:26:16 PM
Last modification on : Saturday, May 25, 2019 - 1:28:21 AM


Files produced by the author(s)


  • HAL Id : tel-02139128, version 1



Michel Pesqueur. L’emploi des blindés français sur le front occidental d’août 1944 à mai 1945. Histoire. Université de Lorraine, 2018. Français. ⟨NNT : 2018LORR0287⟩. ⟨tel-02139128⟩



Record views


Files downloads