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Le "faire-semblant" en procès : examen et défense de la philosophie de Kendall L. Walton

Abstract : The ordinary concept of fiction raises ontological, epistemological, logical and aesthetical questions. Kendall Walton's Mimesis as Make-Believe (1990) introduced a groundbreaking theory on fiction and representation. According to his main claim, the practice of appreciating representational works of art shares significant similarities with the practice of playing games of make-believe. According to Walton, both activities rely on the concept of fictionality, the fact of being true in the fiction, which is understood in terms of prescriptions to imagine. My dissertation consists of an introduction to Walton's philosophy, a commentary of Mimesis' theory of make-believe and a defense against their critics. The first part provides a presentation of Walton's philosophical methodology and discusses one of his most famous articles, "Categories of Art" (1970). The second part provides a detailled commentary of Mimesis, based on a confrontation between Nelson Goodman's theory of representation and Walton's one. The third part is dedicated to analyse the criticisms that are encountered by the theory. A first set of criticisms comes from philosophers admitting the fundamental principles of the theory : those are Gregory Currie (1990), Peter Lamarque and Stein Olsen (1994), or Jerrold Levinson (1993). I argue that those objections are groundless. Another set of criticisms comes from philosophers attempting to undermine the fundamental principles of the theory : those are Stacie Friend (2008), Derek Matravers (2014), or even Walton himself (2015). According to me, those objections are on the right tracks if correctly understood, but fall short from being decisive. Nevertheless, I argue they should lead us to develop a research on the semiotic aspects of fictionality.
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Submitted on : Friday, July 19, 2019 - 10:33:15 AM
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Guillaume Schuppert. Le "faire-semblant" en procès : examen et défense de la philosophie de Kendall L. Walton. Philosophie. Université de Lorraine, 2019. Français. ⟨NNT : 2019LORR0036⟩. ⟨tel-02189166⟩



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