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Perception et réalité‎ : aspects métaphysiques, ontologiques et épistémologiques

Abstract : The main topic of this study is to discuss the idea according to which perceptual experiences sould be conceive as ways of being in contact with the world and perceptual experiences can give reasons for believing some propositions about the world and can give rise to knowledge. Lots of philosophers countervail this intuitive and naive conception of perception. This rejection is linked to the fact that they adopt an internalist conception of perception and/or justication and/or perceptual knowledge. Perceiving sould be conceive as an purely internal event of subjects which possess perceptual capacities. And so, one may doubt that they can have justifications for their beliefs or that they can know anything. Is it possible to avoid this conclusion ? How to alleviate philosophical fear that this conclusion gives rise ? That is the aim of this study. The proposed philosophical inquiry comes in three forms. In the first place, indirect conception of perception is examined and criticized. Afterwards, an inquiry about the nature of perceptual experience is pursued. The stake for us is to defend a strong form of externalism about perception (metaphysical disjunctivism). Then, in the second part of this work, we get into an ontological reflexion about the nature of properties that perceptual experience seems to acquaintance us with. Color Realism is defended against various antirealist objections. Colors are or can be real properties of things. A realist, non redutive and non relationnal ontology for chromatic properties is sketched (color Primitivism). Lastly, the epistemological stakes of perception are underlined and examined. We defend the idea that perceptual experience is a mean by which certain beings can have justified beliefs although this justification is not reflexive and prima facie. It can be so if it's true that perceptual experience puts us in contact with the world (objects, properties, facts, etc.). We examine and reject different replies to skeptical attacks against the possibility of knowing anything. Then, another strategy is proposed (a morean defense of perceptual knowledge and the questioning of skeptical challenge itself). In fact, from an metaphysical, ontological or epistemological point of view, we don't have to give a negative reponse to the classical and philosophical question "Can mind be really in perceptual and cognitive contact with the world ?" or so we think. Indeed, our study underlines that a positive reply to this question is sustainable, not to say correct, and that the negative reponse is probably wrong
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Yannick Chin-Drian. Perception et réalité‎ : aspects métaphysiques, ontologiques et épistémologiques. Philosophie. Université de lorraine, 2013. Français. ⟨NNT : 2013LORR0362⟩. ⟨tel-02434711⟩



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