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Article Dans Une Revue Mathematical Social Sciences Année : 2023

Asking for information prior to settlement or trial when misrepresentation of evidence is possible

Résumé

This paper analyzes how mandated information disclosure prior to settlement negotiations influences equilibrium outcomes when the privately informed party may misrepresent its type at a cost. We establish that private information cannot be fully revealed and that a regime without information sharing may outperform a regime with information sharing according to the criteria of expected social costs and fairness considerations.
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Dates et versions

hal-03987359 , version 1 (14-02-2023)

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Mehdi Ayouni, Tim Friehe, Yannick Gabuthy. Asking for information prior to settlement or trial when misrepresentation of evidence is possible. Mathematical Social Sciences, 2023, 121, pp.26-35. ⟨10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2022.12.001⟩. ⟨hal-03987359⟩
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