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No Future : Sur une fausse distinction entre le possible et le virtuel dans la philosophie de Bergson et ses implications

Abstract : The purpose of the distinction made by Deleuze between the possible and the virtual in Bergson was to show how Bergsonism could be critical of the notion of the possible while remaining a theory of the future. This article aims to show why this distinction in the final analysis is ineffective, and hence it seeks to identify Bergson’s criticism of the possible with a criticism of all thought of the future. Hence it proceeds to refute Deleuze’s reading of Bergson which leads to suggesting an image of Bergsonism different from that proposed by Deleuze and which is widely held, namely that of a philosophy that turns in the first place to the past, for which the notion of possible is reserved, and absolutely refuses to envisage the future.
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https://hal.univ-lorraine.fr/hal-02448263
Contributor : Anthony Feneuil <>
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Anthony Feneuil. No Future : Sur une fausse distinction entre le possible et le virtuel dans la philosophie de Bergson et ses implications. Revue philosophique de Louvain, Peeters Publishers, 2019, 117 (1 (février 2019)), pp.83-111. ⟨10.2143/RPL.117.1.3287048⟩. ⟨hal-02448263⟩

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